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GOVERNMENT RESPONSE TO CASSAVA TRADE GOVERNANCE IN LAMPUNG: FROM PRICE CRISIS TO POLICY ORCHESTRATION

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Abstract

This study examines the development of cassava trade governance in Lampung Province through a narrative policy analysis of 76 online news reports published between 2014 and 2026. The analysis compares four gubernatorial periods: M. Ridho Ficardo, Arinal Djunaidi, Acting Governor Samsudin, and Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. The findings show a gradual shift from market-based governance, initial government coordination, crisis mobilisation, to more formalised policy orchestration. In the earlier periods, cassava governance was mainly shaped by farmers, collectors, and processing factories, while government intervention remained limited. The 2024 price decline expanded the issue into a wider public-governance crisis. Under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal, the provincial government began to formalise its response through gubernatorial instruction and regulation on price arrangements, deduction practices, governance, and downstreaming. The study argues that strategic commodity governance requires actor coordination, institutional rules, and sustained government facilitation.

Keywords: *cassava governance; policy orchestration; Lampung.*

INTRODUCTION

Contemporary public problems increasingly exceed the institutional boundaries and analytical capacities of conventional government. Many policy challenges can no longer be isolated within a single sector, jurisdiction, or organisation because their causes are interdependent, their consequences are uncertain, and the actors involved define both the problem and its possible solutions differently.

Rittel & Webber (1973) conceptualise complex public challenges as wicked problems, namely problems that lack definitive formulations, objectively correct solutions, and clear stopping rules. In governance studies, wickedness does not simply refer to difficulty, but to the interaction of substantive complexity, institutional fragmentation, uncertainty, and divergent stakeholder interests (Alford & Head, 2017; Peters et al., 2026). Such problems require more than technical policy responses because fragmented bureaucratic intervention often addresses symptoms without reorganising the relationships that reproduce the problem. Therefore, governments need stronger capacities for coordination, stakeholder collaboration, adaptive leadership, and institutional learning when dealing with complex policy problem (Head & Alford, 2015; Termeer et al., 2019).

Lampung's cassava trade system illustrates this governance complexity. Although Lampung is widely recognised as Indonesia's principal cassava-producing region, its production capacity has not consistently produced stable farmer prices, equitable value distribution, or strong downstream diversification. The cassava value chain in Lampung involves smallholder farmers, collectors, traders, processing factories, public agencies, and supporting institutions whose roles are closely interdependent. Previous research shows that cassava farmers face interconnected risks related to price fluctuation, production capital, input availability, cultivation standards, marketing, financing, institutional access, and market information (Suryani et al., 2023). These conditions indicate that cassava vulnerability does not originate solely at the farm level, but is embedded in the wider governance of the commodity value chain.



Figure 1. Cassava Production and Producer Price Trends in Lampung Province, 2016–2024
Source: Compiled from BPS–Statistics of Lampung Province and processed by the author, 2026.

Figure 1 illustrates the central paradox of Lampung's cassava economy. The expansion of cassava production was not consistently followed by improved producer prices. The sharp decline in prices toward the end of the observed period indicates that production growth alone was insufficient to secure farmers' economic position. This divergence suggests that the cassava problem is not merely an issue of agricultural productivity, but also of trade governance, industrial absorption, price formation, market information, quality assessment, and bargaining power across the cassava value chain.

Marketing relations further shape how benefits are distributed within this system. Studies on cassava marketing in Lampung show that different marketing channels produce different levels of farmer share and trade efficiency, with shorter links between farmers and processing factories offering more favourable outcomes than longer chains involving additional intermediaries (Murniati et al., 2021). Although collectors and local agents perform important functions in transportation, aggregation, financing, and information distribution, long marketing chains may also reinforce farmers' dependence on actors controlling market access. Therefore, the central issue is not simply the presence of intermediaries, but how market functions, risks, information, and benefits are distributed among actors with unequal economic capacity. Previous studies have proposed institutional partnerships as a strategy for improving the sustainability of Lampung's cassava agribusiness. Zulkarnain et al. (2021), for example, emphasise the importance of horizontal coordination between farmer organisations and tapioca factories to maintain remunerative farmer prices while ensuring continuity of industrial supply. However, partnership arrangements cannot work effectively without a supportive institutional environment. Their sustainability depends on credible rules, representative farmer organisations, accessible market information, dispute-resolution mechanisms, and government facilitation. In this sense, partnership alone is insufficient when bargaining power remains unequal; it must be supported by governance arrangements that regulate market relations and strengthen accountability.

The persistence of cassava price disputes demonstrates the limits of treating the problem merely as a private market relationship between farmers and factories. In May 2025, the Government of Lampung issued Governor Instruction No. 2 of 2025 concerning cassava price determination, which established a purchasing price of IDR 1,350 per kilogram, a maximum deduction of 30 percent, and purchasing without starch-content measurement (Biro Hukum Provinsi Lampung, 2025a). In October 2025, this response was strengthened through Governor Regulation No. 36 of 2025 concerning Cassava Governance and Downstreaming, which broadened the intervention from short-term price correction to a more comprehensive framework covering price references, production governance, institutional arrangements, and downstream development (Biro Hukum Provinsi Lampung, 2025b).

This transition indicates that the cassava crisis required more than episodic market intervention; it required the state to reorganise relationships among production, industrial demand, pricing, farmer protection, and downstream policy. These conditions show the characteristics of a complex governance problem. Farmers seek higher and more predictable prices, while processing industries require stable supply, competitive input costs, and consistent starch quality. Collectors connect dispersed farmers with industrial buyers, but long marketing chains may also reinforce farmers' dependence on intermediaries. At the same time, district governments hold responsibilities for local agricultural development, the provincial government must coordinate across territories and sectors, and central ministries regulate policy domains such as trade, industry, commodity standards, and import policy. Consequently, cassava governance involves actors that are interdependent but unequal in authority, resources, information, and bargaining position.

The cassava trade system therefore resembles a governance network in which no single actor can independently reorganise the entire system. Farmers depend on industrial market access, factories depend on continuous raw-material supply, governments depend on private actors for implementation, and all actors are affected by market conditions that cannot be fully controlled locally. This interdependence makes hierarchical command insufficient, but it also means that the network cannot govern itself spontaneously. Coordination must be organised, conflicts mediated, information exchanged, and collective commitments monitored. In this context, collaborative governance is relevant because it highlights the importance of institutional design, facilitative leadership, trust-building, and joint action among actors with different interests and resources (Ansell & Gash, 2008; Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015).

Policy orchestration is used in this study to explain this coordinating role. It refers to the capacity of the provincial government to connect fragmented actors, coordinate policy responses, and formalise intervention in a contested commodity system. In Lampung's cassava governance, the governor occupies an important position between central government, district governments, legislative institutions, farmer groups, processing industries, traders, and other stakeholders. The governor cannot directly control all market actors or independently determine commodity prices, but the provincial government has regulatory authority, political legitimacy, convening capacity, and administrative resources that can be used to organise collective responses. Thus, policy orchestration provides a useful lens for understanding how Lampung's cassava governance moved from market dispute and crisis response toward more formalised government coordination.

This study does not seek to construct a comprehensive leadership model. Instead, it uses policy orchestration as an analytical lens to explain how the Government of Lampung responded to cassava trade problems through coordination, actor mobilisation, and formal policy instruments. The analysis focuses on how the governance of cassava shifted across four gubernatorial periods: from market-based relations, to initial government coordination, to crisis mobilisation, and finally to more formalised policy orchestration under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. Accordingly, this study asks: How did the Government of Lampung respond to cassava trade governance problems across four gubernatorial periods, and how did these responses move toward policy orchestration? The study aims to explain the development of government responses to cassava trade problems based on online news reports and supporting policy documents. Empirically, it shifts the analysis of cassava from production and price issues alone toward the changing pattern of government coordination, actor involvement, and policy formalisation. Practically, it shows how temporary crisis responses can move toward a more institutionalised form of commodity governance through gubernatorial instruction and regulation.

METHODS

This study used a narrative policy analysis based on online news reports (Howland et al., 2006; Pasquinelli & Trunfio, 2020). This approach was used to trace how public narratives, dominant issues, key actors, and government responses concerning Lampung's cassava trade governance evolved across different gubernatorial periods (Considine, 2005; Crow & Berggren, 2014; Leach et al., 2010). Rather than measuring actor centrality statistically, the study employed simple descriptive quantification and thematic interpretation to explain the gradual shift from market-based governance to policy orchestration.

The study analysed 76 online news articles published between 2014 and 2026 concerning cassava production, pricing, marketing, industrial processing, farmer–factory relations, downstream development, public regulation, and intergovernmental coordination in Lampung Province. The corpus was divided according to four gubernatorial leadership periods: M. Ridho Ficardo, Arinal Djunaidi, Acting Governor Samsudin, and Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. Articles were collected using combinations of keywords such as singkong Lampung, ubi kayu Lampung, harga singkong, tata niaga singkong, rafaksi singkong, pabrik tapioka, petani singkong, and hilirisasi ubi kayu. Articles were included when they reported an identifiable governance issue, actor, policy response, or interaction related to cassava trade governance. Duplicate, syndicated, irrelevant, and incomplete reports were removed.

Multiple reports describing the same meeting, regulation, protest, or agreement were consolidated into a single governance event to avoid repeated counting of the same occurrence. News reports were interpreted as records of media-reported governance narratives rather than as a complete representation of all actor relationships, because media data may contain selection and description biases (Earl et al., 2004). The analysis focused on four main aspects: the number of news reports in each gubernatorial period, the dominant issues reported, the key actors mentioned, and the form of government response. The news corpus was first classified by period and issue category, including price instability, deduction practices, farmer–factory relations, government coordination, regulatory intervention, and downstream development. The frequency of reports was used only as descriptive information to indicate the intensity of public attention in each period. The qualitative analysis was conducted through thematic reading of the news corpus. Each period was interpreted narratively to identify the dominant pattern of cassava trade governance. The four periods were then compared to explain the shift from market-based governance under M. Ridho Ficardo, initial government coordination under Arinal Djunaidi, crisis mobilisation under Acting Governor Samsudin, and policy orchestration under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. Official policy documents, particularly the gubernatorial instruction and gubernatorial regulation on cassava governance, were used as supporting materials to contextualise the formalisation of government intervention. This study does not aim to establish a direct causal relationship between government intervention and cassava price changes. Instead, it explains how the reported improvement and stabilisation of cassava prices coincided with the emergence of a more formalised policy orchestration process by the provincial government.

RESULTS & DISCUSSION

A. Market-Based Cassava Governance under M. Ridho Ficardo

During the administration of M. Ridho Ficardo, cassava trade governance in Lampung was still largely represented in online news as a market-based issue rather than as an integrated public policy problem. The number of news reports identified in this period was limited, with only four articles discussing cassava-related issues. This limited coverage indicates that cassava had not yet become an intensive governance concern in the provincial policy agenda. The dominant issues reported in the news were related to farmers' economic position, marketing relations, and their dependence on collectors and processing factories. In this period, the main actors appearing in the news were farmers, collectors, processing factories, and the Lampung Provincial Government. However, the reported relationships were still centred on the commodity-marketing chain rather than on formal government coordination. The pattern of governance during this period shows that cassava was primarily understood through the relationship between producers, intermediaries, and industrial buyers. Farmers appeared as the most affected actors because their income depended on purchasing prices, market access, and the role of collectors or factories. Collectors and processing factories occupied important positions in the trade chain because they connected farm-level production with industrial absorption. Meanwhile, the provincial government appeared more as a reactive actor responding to farmers' concerns than as a coordinating institution capable of organising a broader policy response. In other words, the issue of cassava had not yet been framed as a cross-sectoral governance problem involving agriculture, trade, industry, farmer protection, and regional economic development. This finding can be interpreted through the concept of governance networks. Provan & Kenis (2008) argue that network governance becomes necessary when interdependent actors cannot achieve collective outcomes through isolated action. In the Ridho Ficardo period, the cassava trade system already involved interdependence among farmers, collectors, and factories, but this interdependence had not yet developed into a coordinated governance network. The actors were connected through market transactions, not through institutionalised coordination. Therefore, the existence of interaction among actors did not automatically produce governance capacity. The cassava system remained a market-based arrangement because no actor had yet emerged as a strong organiser of collective action.

From the perspective of collaborative governance, this period also shows the absence of strong facilitative leadership. Ansell & Gash (2008) explain that collaboration requires institutional design, inclusive participation, facilitative leadership, and trust-building among actors with different interests and resources. In the cassava case, farmers, collectors, and factories had clear economic interdependence, but the news reports did not yet show a structured forum or sustained institutional arrangement that could mediate their interests. Farmers' visibility in the media therefore reflected their vulnerability rather than their bargaining power. They were central to the problem but not yet supported by a governance mechanism capable of balancing market relations.

This condition also demonstrates the limit of treating commodity problems as purely market problems. Cassava prices, deductions, and marketing access are not only economic issues; they are shaped by institutional arrangements, bargaining positions, and the capacity of government to organise policy responses. However, during the Ridho Ficardo administration, the reported role of government had not yet moved toward policy orchestration. Policy orchestration requires the state to connect actors, align responses, and create a more coherent framework for dealing with fragmented problems (Howland et al., 2006; Pasquinelli & Trunfio, 2020). In this period, such orchestration was not yet visible in the public narrative. Therefore, the Ridho Ficardo period can be characterised as a phase of market-based cassava governance. The governance of cassava remained dependent on commodity-chain relations among farmers, collectors, and processing factories, while provincial intervention had not yet developed into systematic coordination. This period provides the baseline for understanding the later transformation of cassava governance in Lampung. Subsequent periods show a gradual shift from market-based relations toward initial government coordination, crisis mobilisation, and eventually more formalised policy orchestration under the provincial government.

B. Initial Government Coordination under Arinal Djunaidi

During the administration of Arinal Djunaidi, cassava trade governance in Lampung began to show an initial shift from purely market-based relations toward more visible government coordination. The number of online news reports identified in this period remained limited, with four articles discussing cassava-related issues. However, compared with the previous period, the public narrative began to involve a broader set of actors, including the provincial government, the governor, farmers, farmer groups, collectors, processing factories, and higher education institutions. This indicates that cassava was no longer reported only as a direct market relationship between farmers, collectors, and factories, but also as an issue requiring government attention and knowledge-based assessment. The dominant issues in this period were still related to production, price dynamics, marketing relations, and the position of farmers within the cassava trade chain. However, government involvement became more visible through monitoring, studies, and interaction with agribusiness actors. The provincial government began to appear not merely as a recipient of farmers' complaints, but as an actor that attempted to understand the problem through coordination and policy attention. Nevertheless, the role of government had not yet developed into a consolidated orchestration process. Market actors, especially collectors and processing factories, still shaped much of the cassava trade arrangement. This pattern reflects an early stage of governance expansion. Provan & Kenis (2008) explain that governance networks become important when public problems involve multiple interdependent actors who cannot achieve collective outcomes through isolated action. In the Arinal Djunaidi period, the cassava issue began to move in this direction because the problem was increasingly connected to production, market access, industrial absorption, farmer organisation, and government attention. However, the reported interactions still suggest that coordination was emerging rather than consolidated. Public institutions were present, but they had not yet become the main organiser of the cassava governance system. From the perspective of collaborative governance, this period also shows the beginning of institutional engagement, although the conditions for strong collaboration were not yet fully established. Ansell & Gash (2008) argue that collaborative governance requires facilitative leadership, inclusive forums, trust-building, and clear institutional design. In this period, the government's involvement indicated a movement toward facilitation, but the available news reports did not yet show a stable policy forum or binding institutional arrangement capable of aligning farmers, collectors, factories, and government agencies. Therefore, the relationship among actors remained partly coordinated but still largely dependent on market mechanisms.

This period is also important because it shows the distinction between government presence and policy orchestration. Government presence means that public institutions begin to observe, respond, or coordinate around an issue. Policy orchestration, however, requires a stronger capacity to connect actors, align sectoral responses, formalise intervention, and regulate unequal relations within the commodity system. During Arinal Djunaidi's administration, the provincial government had begun to enter the cassava governance arena, but the coordination function remained distributed and had not yet been formalised into a coherent policy framework. This is consistent with the price pattern reported in the corpus, where cassava prices still fluctuated during this period and did not yet reflect a durable stabilisation mechanism. Therefore, the Arinal Djunaidi period can be characterised as a phase of initial government coordination. Cassava governance was no longer entirely market-based, but it had not yet become an orchestrated policy process. The government began to pay attention to the issue, interact with relevant actors, and frame cassava as a matter of public concern. However, the absence of stronger institutional instruments meant that the governance pattern remained transitional. This period became an intermediate stage between the market-based arrangement under M. Ridho Ficardo and the later crisis mobilisation that emerged during the Acting Governor Samsudin period.

C. *Crisis Mobilisation under Acting Governor Samsudin*

During the administration of Acting Governor Samsudin, cassava trade governance in Lampung entered a more conflictual and publicly visible phase. The number of online news reports increased to 12 articles, indicating that cassava was no longer reported merely as a market issue but had become a wider public-governance concern. The dominant issues during this period were related to declining cassava prices, farmers' protests, deduction practices, factory purchasing behaviour, and demands for stronger government intervention. Compared with the previous periods, the public narrative became more intensive and involved a broader range of actors. The corpus shows that the issue began to involve farmers, collectors, processing factories, industry representatives, the Lampung Provincial Government, the Acting Governor, the Lampung Provincial Parliament, the Cassava Trade Special Committee, the Minister of Agriculture, the Business Competition Supervisory Commission, importers, students, and farmer organisations. This development shows that the cassava problem had moved beyond the ordinary relationship between farmers, collectors, and processing factories. The decline in price and the contestation over deduction practices transformed cassava into a crisis issue that required broader political and institutional attention. Farmers appeared strongly in the news because they were directly affected by falling prices and perceived unfairness in market practices. Legislative institutions also became more visible through oversight and the formation of a special committee, while central-government actors entered the public narrative through agricultural and regulatory concerns. In this period, the provincial government was no longer merely observing the issue, but began to connect with various actors in response to the growing crisis.

Theoretically, this period reflects a phase of crisis mobilisation. In collaborative governance, conflict can become an entry point for broader actor involvement when public problems cannot be resolved by a single institution or through ordinary market mechanisms. Ansell & Gash (2008) argue that collaboration is shaped by starting conditions, power imbalance, previous conflict, institutional design, facilitative leadership, and trust-building. In the Samsudin period, the cassava issue clearly contained these conditions. Farmers and factories had different interests in price and quality assessment; government institutions had partial authority; and the problem required coordination across agriculture, trade, industry, market regulation, and political oversight.

However, the mobilisation of actors did not automatically create a stable governance arrangement. This is consistent with network governance theory. Provan & Kenis (2008) explain that a wider network does not necessarily become effective simply because more actors are involved. Network effectiveness depends on coordination capacity, goal consensus, trust, and the ability to organise collective action. In the Samsudin period, actor involvement expanded, but the public narrative still showed fragmented responses. Farmers, provincial government, legislative institutions, central-government actors, and regulatory bodies appeared in the same crisis arena, but their roles were not yet fully integrated into a coherent policy framework. The crisis attracted attention, but attention had not yet become orchestration. From the perspective of policy orchestration, this period can be read as a transitional stage. The Acting Governor became more visible as a connecting actor, but the governance process remained distributed among several centres of concern: farmers raised demands, the provincial government responded administratively, DPRD conducted political oversight, central-government actors entered through national policy concerns, and regulatory bodies were associated with market supervision. The earlier draft describes this condition as mobilisation without full orchestration, because the additional actors were still organised through partially separated governmental, market, regulatory, and societal arenas.

Therefore, the Samsudin period can be characterised as a phase of crisis mobilisation. The cassava issue had expanded from market-based relations into a broader public problem involving multiple institutions and stakeholders. However, the response remained transitional because actor mobilisation had not yet been formalised into a stable policy arrangement. This period became the bridge between initial government coordination under Arinal Djunaidi and more formalised policy orchestration under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. In this sense, the Samsudin period is important not because it completed the governance transformation, but because it opened the crisis arena that later made stronger orchestration possible.

D. Policy Orchestration under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal

During the administration of Rahmat Mirzani Djausal, cassava trade governance in Lampung entered a more formalised phase of policy orchestration. The online news corpus shows a sharp increase in public attention during this period, with 54 articles discussing cassava-related issues. This indicates that cassava had become a major policy concern in the provincial governance agenda. The dominant issues reported in this period included cassava price stabilisation, deduction practices, farmer–factory relations, government meetings, coordination with central government, regulatory intervention, and downstream development. Compared with the previous periods, the narrative was no longer dominated only by farmers’ protests or market uncertainty, but increasingly by government-led efforts to organise the cassava trade system through more formal policy instruments.

The key actors appearing in this period were more diverse and institutionally connected. The news reports involved the governor, the Lampung Provincial Government, farmers, collectors, processing factories, farmer organisations, the Provincial Parliament, district governments, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Trade, the Ministry of Industry, national political actors, importers, exporters, and other supporting institutions. This actor composition shows that cassava governance had moved beyond a local commodity problem and had become a cross-sectoral issue involving agriculture, trade, industry, regional development, and intergovernmental coordination. In this context, the governor appeared not only as a political executive, but as a coordinating actor who connected farmers, factories, provincial agencies, legislative institutions, district governments, and central-government actors.

The most important change in this period was the movement from crisis response to policy formalisation. The issuance of Governor Instruction No. 2 of 2025 concerning the determination of cassava prices marked an initial formal intervention by the provincial government in the cassava trade system. The instruction established a purchasing price reference, regulated deduction limits, and addressed purchasing practices that had become a source of contestation between farmers and factories. This was later strengthened by Governor Regulation No. 36 of 2025 concerning Cassava Governance and Downstreaming, which broadened the government's role from short-term price response to a more comprehensive framework of production governance, purchasing-price references, institutional arrangements, farmer protection, and downstream development.

From the perspective of policy orchestration, this period shows a clearer role of the provincial government in connecting fragmented actors and aligning policy responses. Policy orchestration does not mean that the governor directly controls all market actors or determines prices independently. Rather, it refers to the capacity of government to convene actors, mediate conflict, regulate contested practices, and formalise collective responses through policy instruments. This is consistent with the idea that governance networks require coordination capacity when actors are interdependent but cannot solve problems through isolated action (Provan & Kenis, 2008). In the cassava case, farmers depended on market access and fair purchasing practices, factories depended on raw material supply and quality, while government had to manage public pressure, industrial continuity, and regional economic stability.

This period also reflects the logic of collaborative governance and metagovernance. Ansell and Gash (2008) emphasise that collaboration requires facilitative leadership, institutional design, and trust-building among actors with different interests and resources. Meanwhile, metagovernance highlights the role of public authority in steering networks through regulation, institutional design, convening, and negotiation (Ayres, 2019; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009). In the RMD period, the provincial government did not merely invite actors into discussion; it began to create a formal policy frame through gubernatorial instruction and regulation. This made the governance response more institutionalised than the crisis mobilisation observed during the Samsudin period.

The improvement of cassava prices during this period should be interpreted carefully. The reported price recovery coincided with stronger government orchestration, but this study does not claim that gubernatorial intervention directly caused the price increase. Cassava prices remain influenced by production volume, factory absorption, imports, starch quality, market demand, and broader economic conditions. The more defensible argument is that policy orchestration made the price problem more governable by creating formal rules, coordinating actors, reducing uncertainty in purchasing practices, and strengthening the government's role as a mediator between farmers and industry. The earlier draft also emphasises that price recovery was associated with stronger orchestration but did not establish direct causality.

Therefore, the Rahmat Mirzani Djausal period can be characterised as a phase of policy orchestration. The provincial government moved from reactive crisis handling toward a more structured governance arrangement. The governor became the central figure in connecting actors, framing the cassava issue as a public policy problem, and institutionalising government intervention through formal regulation. This phase marks the most visible transformation in Lampung's cassava governance: from market-based relations and crisis mobilisation toward a more formalised effort to govern the cassava trade system through coordinated and institutionalised policy action.

E. From Market Response to Policy Orchestration

The comparison of the four gubernatorial periods shows that cassava trade governance in Lampung did not change abruptly, but developed through a gradual shift from market-based relations to more formalised policy orchestration. During the M. Ridho Ficardo period, cassava was mainly represented in the news as a market issue involving farmers, collectors, and processing factories. Under Arinal Djunaidi, government attention became more visible, although coordination remained limited and market actors continued to shape the dominant trade arrangement. During the Samsudin period, the decline in cassava prices and the contestation over deduction practices transformed the issue into a wider public crisis, attracting legislative institutions, central-government actors, regulatory bodies, and farmer organisations. The most visible transformation appeared under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal, when the provincial government began to formalise its intervention through gubernatorial instruction and regulation. This trajectory indicates that the cassava issue gradually moved from an economic problem into a governance problem. In the earlier periods, the main concern was how farmers related to collectors and factories within the commodity chain. The state appeared only partially, either as a recipient of complaints or as a limited coordinating actor. However, as price instability, deduction practices, and farmer–factory tensions intensified, cassava governance required broader institutional involvement. This supports the argument that complex commodity problems cannot be managed only through market adjustment because they involve interdependent actors, unequal bargaining positions, and fragmented authority across sectors and levels of government.



Figure 2. Cassava Producer Price Dynamics Across Gubernatorial Periods, 2014–2026
Source: Compiled from the research dataset and processed by the authors, 2026.

Figure 2 shows that cassava prices in Lampung experienced repeated fluctuations across the four gubernatorial periods. During the M. Ridho Ficardo and Arinal Djunaidi periods, the reported price increased from IDR 1,154 per kilogram in 2016 to IDR 1,642 in 2018, before declining to IDR 1,450 in 2019. The price then fluctuated between IDR 1,429 and IDR 1,591 during 2020–2022, before falling to IDR 1,250 in 2023. This pattern indicates that price improvement in the earlier periods was not yet supported by a durable stabilisation mechanism. Cassava governance was still largely shaped by market relations among farmers, collectors, and processing factories, while government involvement remained limited to monitoring, coordination, or partial response. The sharp decline to IDR 718 per kilogram in 2024 marked a turning point in Lampung's cassava trade governance. At this stage, the cassava problem was no longer perceived merely as a market issue between farmers and factories, but as a wider public-governance problem involving price fairness, deduction practices, farmer protection, industrial purchasing behaviour, and government responsibility. The Samsudin period therefore represented a phase of crisis mobilisation. More actors entered the public discussion, including provincial institutions, legislative bodies, central-government actors, regulatory agencies, farmer organisations, and industry representatives. However, actor mobilisation did not immediately produce an integrated policy response. The crisis attracted attention, but the governance arrangement had not yet become sufficiently formalised. A different pattern appeared during the Rahmat Mirzani Djausal period. The reported cassava price increased from IDR 718 per kilogram in 2024 to IDR 1,350 in 2025 and IDR 2,450 in 2026. This recovery coincided with the emergence of a more formalised government response through Governor Instruction No. 2 of 2025 and the subsequent gubernatorial regulation on cassava governance and downstreaming.

Table 1. Leadership Trajectory in Lampung's Cassava Trade Governance

Gubernatorial Period	News Reports	Dominant Issues	Main Actors in Public Narrative	Governance Pattern	Leadership Trajectory
M. Ridho Ficardo	4	Price fluctuation, farmer vulnerability, marketing relations	Farmers, collectors, processing factories, provincial government	Market-based governance	Government was still peripheral and reactive; cassava was mainly treated as a market-chain issue.
Arinal Djunaidi	4	Production, price dynamics, early government attention	Provincial government, governor, farmers, farmer groups, collectors, processing factories, higher education institutions	Initial government coordination	Government began to enter the issue, but coordination had not yet become a consolidated policy process.
Acting Governor Samsudin	12	Price decline, farmer protest, deduction practices, factory purchasing behaviour, demand for intervention	Farmers, provincial government, DPRD, special committee, Ministry of Agriculture, regulatory bodies, factories,	Crisis mobilisation	The issue expanded into a public-governance crisis, but actor involvement was not yet formalised into a stable

			industry actors		policy framework.
Rahmat Mirzani Djausal	54	Price stabilisation, deduction limits, farmer–factory relations, gubernatorial instruction, gubernatorial regulation, downstreaming	Governor, provincial government, farmers, factories, DPRD, district governments, central ministries, industry actors	Policy orchestration	Government became the main coordinating actor by connecting stakeholders and formalising intervention through policy instruments.

Source: Authors' analysis based on online news corpus, 2014–2026.

These policy instruments marked an important shift from temporary crisis response toward policy orchestration. The provincial government began to organise the relationship among farmers, factories, and public institutions through price references, deduction limits, production governance, farmer protection, and downstream development. This price trajectory should not be interpreted as proof that gubernatorial intervention directly caused the increase in cassava prices. Cassava prices are also influenced by production volume, industrial absorption, market demand, import policy, starch quality, and broader economic conditions. The more careful interpretation is that the reported price recovery coincided with a stronger and more institutionalised orchestration process. In this sense, government intervention made the cassava issue more governable by creating formal rules, coordinating relevant actors, reducing uncertainty in purchasing practices, and providing a clearer institutional basis for managing farmer–factory relations.

Therefore, the price dynamics reinforce the main argument of this study: Lampung's cassava governance gradually moved from market-based adjustment toward formalised policy orchestration. In the earlier periods, price movements occurred without a clear institutional stabilisation framework. The 2024 crisis expanded the issue into a public-governance arena, while the RMD period marked the beginning of a more structured response through formal provincial policy instruments. This confirms that strategic commodity governance requires more than market correction; it requires coordination capacity, institutional rules, and sustained government facilitation to manage interdependence among farmers, industries, and public authorities (Emerson & Nabatchi, 2015; Provan & Kenis, 2008)

From the perspective of governance networks, the Lampung case shows that actor involvement alone is not sufficient to create effective governance. Provan & Kenis (2008) argue that network effectiveness depends on coordination capacity, trust, goal alignment, and the ability to organise collective action. This is visible in the Samsudin period, where more actors entered the cassava governance arena, but their involvement still reflected crisis mobilisation rather than a stable policy arrangement. Farmers, factories, DPRD, the provincial government, central ministries, and regulatory institutions were increasingly present, yet their roles had not been integrated into a coherent governance framework. The shift under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal is therefore important because it shows the movement from mobilisation to orchestration. Policy orchestration does not mean that the governor controls all actors or directly determines market prices. Rather, it refers to the ability of the provincial government to connect fragmented actors, mediate competing interests, regulate contested practices, and formalise government intervention through policy instruments. This is consistent with collaborative governance, which emphasises facilitative leadership, institutional design, trust-building, and shared action among actors with different interests and resources (Ansell & Gash, 2008). It also reflects the logic of metagovernance, where public authorities steer governance networks through regulation, convening, negotiation, and institutional framing (Ayres, 2019; Sørensen & Torfing, 2009).

The issuance of gubernatorial instruction and gubernatorial regulation became the clearest marker of this orchestration process. These instruments shifted the government response from temporary crisis handling toward a more institutionalised framework for cassava governance. Through these formal policies, the provincial government began to address not only price references, but also deduction practices, farmer protection, production governance, and downstream development. In this sense, policy orchestration worked as a bridge between immediate crisis response and longer-term commodity governance. The reported improvement of cassava prices during the RMD period should be interpreted with caution. This study does not claim that gubernatorial intervention directly caused price recovery, because cassava prices are also influenced by production volume, industrial absorption, market demand, import policy, starch quality, and broader economic conditions. Government intervention made the cassava problem more governable by creating rules, coordinating actors, reducing uncertainty, and providing a clearer institutional basis for managing farmer–factory relations.

Overall, the four-period comparison demonstrates a clear governance trajectory: market-based governance under M. Ridho Ficardo, initial government coordination under

Arinal Djunaidi, crisis mobilisation under Acting Governor Samsudin, and policy orchestration under Rahmat Mirzani Djausal. This trajectory shows that the central transformation in Lampung's cassava trade governance was not merely the increase in government attention, but the gradual formalisation of the provincial government's coordinating role. The cassava case therefore provides an example of how a regional government can move from reactive intervention toward more structured policy orchestration in managing a strategic agricultural commodity.

CONCLUSION

This study examined the development of cassava trade governance in Lampung Province through a narrative policy analysis of online news reports published between 2014 and 2026. By comparing four gubernatorial periods, the study shows that cassava governance gradually shifted from market-based relations to initial government coordination, crisis mobilisation, and eventually policy orchestration. The findings indicate that the cassava problem was not merely a matter of production or price fluctuation, but also a governance issue involving farmers, collectors, processing factories, legislative institutions, provincial agencies, district governments, and central-government actors.

During the M. Ridho Ficardo period, cassava governance was still largely shaped by market relations among farmers, collectors, and processing factories. The provincial government appeared only in a limited and reactive manner. Under Arinal Djunaidi, government attention became more visible through initial coordination and policy concern, although market actors still strongly influenced the trade arrangement. The Samsudin period marked a phase of crisis mobilisation, as falling prices, farmer protests, deduction practices, and public pressure brought more actors into the cassava governance arena. However, this mobilisation had not yet developed into a stable and formalised policy arrangement. The most visible shift occurred during the Rahmat Mirzani Djausal period. In this phase, the provincial government began to perform a stronger coordinating role by connecting farmers, factories, legislative institutions, district governments, and central-government actors. The issuance of gubernatorial instruction and gubernatorial regulation marked an important movement from temporary crisis response toward more formalised policy orchestration. These instruments provided a policy basis for regulating price references, deduction practices, production governance, farmer protection, and downstream development. The reported improvement of cassava prices its indicates that price stabilisation coincided with the emergence of a more structured and institutionalised governance response.

The study contributes to the discussion of commodity governance by showing how a provincial government can move from reactive intervention toward policy orchestration in a fragmented trade system. In practical terms, the Lampung case suggests that strategic commodity problems require more than temporary price correction. They require actor coordination, formal rules, transparent market practices, farmer representation, and institutional continuity. Therefore, the future governance of cassava in Lampung should strengthen the implementation of existing regulations, improve monitoring of factory purchasing practices, ensure transparent deduction standards, expand downstream development, and build more stable communication mechanisms between farmers, industries, and government institutions.

Overall, the Lampung cassava case demonstrates that policy orchestration is not a single event, but a gradual process of transforming dispersed market relations into a more coordinated governance arrangement. The movement from market-based governance to formalised orchestration provides an important lesson for regional governments dealing with strategic agricultural commodities that involve price instability, unequal bargaining power, and fragmented institutional authority.

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